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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM: CONSUMER-DIRECTED
MEDICAID AND COST-SHIFTING TO PATIENTS

SIDNEY D. WATSON*
Consumer-directed health care has emerged as one of the most influential
ideas in health care policy.1 Its supporters hypothesize that health care costs
are high and quality is low because our current system of health insurance fails
to provide consumers with incentives to use care wisely and shop for high
value services.2 Advocates of consumer-directed health care argue that giving
patients financial incentives—through higher out-of-pocket costs—to take
personal responsibility for their own health and health care will create market
forces to control costs and improve quality and outcomes.3 If patients have
“skin in the game,” the demand for unnecessary medical services will be
curtailed.
When adherents of consumer-directed health care turn to Medicaid, they
complain that federal Medicaid rules prevent states from requiring that
recipients accept personal responsibility for the costs of their care.4 They warn
that moral hazard is a problem with any health insurance, but it is an even
bigger problem with Medicaid because Medicaid offers more generous
coverage than private health insurance and imposes only very small patient
cost-sharing.5
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law Center for Health Law Studies. My
thanks to Sarah Kaufman, Rebecca Frigy, and Emily Simpson who provided exceptional research
assistance and advice. My thanks also to the other speakers at the Saint Louis University School
of Law Health Law Symposium and to those who participated in the 2006 Suffolk University
Law School Health Law and Policy Forum for their comments and suggestions.
1. Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early Evidence
About Effects on Cost and Quality, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 24, 2006, at w516, http://content.health
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w516.pdf.
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. Michael F. Cannon, Medicaid’s Unseen Costs, 548 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 9
(2005).
5. Id. “Moral hazard” posits that individuals are likely to incur more costs when someone
else is financially responsible. See John A. Nyman, Is “Moral Hazard” Inefficient? The Policy
Implications of a New Theory, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 194, 194. Proponents of
consumer-directed health care often use the example of free coffee at the office to illustrate their
point. People drink more coffee when they do not have to pay for it. Charging for the coffee will
drive down consumption and thus drive down costs for coffee. In this worldview, imposing more
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These partisans describe Medicaid as no longer a safety net for the “truly
needy,” but a program that includes those who should be able to purchase
health insurance or health care in the private market. They do not believe that
working families need the comprehensive coverage that Medicaid provides—
coverage that mimics employer-sponsored insurance should be adequate.
Consumer-directed Medicaid proclaims: “[A]nyone can pay a few dollars,
personal responsibility is important.”
As in the private sector, consumer-directed Medicaid has emerged as a
new, powerful vision in an ongoing debate about Medicaid’s form and future.
A few states have begun applying the tools of consumer-driven health care to
Medicaid, reducing benefits and increasing patient costs.6 Florida has made
the boldest move: an approved Section 1115 Waiver that transforms Medicaid
from health insurance into a defined-benefit voucher program.7 Now the
Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 gives states unprecedented flexibility to
transform Medicaid in the direction of consumer-directed health care through
increased patient cost-sharing, limited-benefit packages benchmarked to
private insurance coverage, and high-deductible Medicaid plans linked to
Health Savings Accounts.8
Yet consumer-directed Medicaid rests on myths and misconceptions. Part
I of this article provides an overview of Medicaid’s structure, explaining its
unique design as a safety net insurer. Part I concludes with an analysis of
recent Medicaid enrollment increases and the financial pressures that have led
states to call for Medicaid reform. Part II explains how consumer-directed
health care has stepped into the Medicaid reform debate. In particular, Part II
examines three aspects of the DRA of 2005—increased cost-sharing, limitedbenefit packages, and vouchers—that give states new discretion to shift costs
to Medicaid patients.
Part III explains why consumer-directed health care is a misdiagnosis for
Medicaid. While Medicaid recipients are no longer just very poor welfare
recipients, the near poor and even moderate-income Americans can no longer
afford the premiums and out-of-pocket costs imposed by private insurance.
Medicaid is a cost-effective health insurer with a track record of providing
quality medical care. The prescription should be more Medicaid, not less.
Medicaid recipients do not use extra, unnecessary medical services. The
challenge for Medicaid recipients is not too little personal responsibility but
too much.

costs on patients will cause them to become more astute users and discourage unnecessary use of
medical services, driving down costs and driving up quality.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part II.D.
8. CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE: S. 1932 DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005 40–
42 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7028/s1932conf.pdf.
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I. MEDICAID: THE VIEW FROM ABOVE
Medicaid is the nation’s safety net health insurance program.9 Codified at
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Medicaid is a joint federal-state program
that provides federal financial assistance to states operating approved medicalassistance plans.10 Federal law outlines broad “mandatory” requirements that
state Medicaid programs must meet, but states retain considerable flexibility to
cover additional “optional” eligibility groups and categories of services.11
States may also seek “waivers” from the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to use Medicaid funds to pay for services not otherwise authorized by
the federal statute and regulations.12 As a result, Medicaid eligibility and
services vary widely among states, and Medicaid operates as fifty-one distinct
programs—one in each state and the District of Columbia.
Medicaid’s joint federal-state structure has made Medicaid an attractive
financing option for states looking to cover new health care needs for
vulnerable populations. The federal Medicaid contribution is open-ended,
limited only by the amount of state funds individual states are willing to
contribute.13 The federal match rate ranges from 50% to 77%, depending on
the state’s per capita income—with poorer states entitled to a higher federal
contribution.14 With an average federal match rate of 57%, Medicaid allows
states to, at a minimum, “double their money” by using Medicaid to finance
medical care.15
As a result, Medicaid has grown to finance an astonishing range of safety
net health insurance expansions, public health initiatives, and state health
reform initiatives.16 Medicaid now provides health insurance for over 55
million children, parents, seniors, and persons with disabilities, covering more

9. See generally ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN
AMERICA: A CASE STUDY IN MEDICAID (1974) (providing a thorough history of the passage and
initial years of Medicaid).
10. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396–1396v (2003 & Supp. 2006).
11. See id. §§ 1396(a), 1396(d).
12. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human
Services broad authority to waive statutory and regulatory provisions of health and welfare
programs, like Medicaid. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a)(1) (2003 & Supp. 2006). Section 1915(c) of the
Act gives the Secretary authority to waive statutory and regulatory provisions to allow states to
operate home and community based long-term programs. Id. § 1396(n). Managed care programs
are operated by many states under Section 1915(b) waivers.
13. ANDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, THE
MEDICAID RESOURCE BOOK, 86 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2236index.cfm.
14. Id. at 89–90.
15. Id.
16. Sarah Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7,
9–10 (2001).
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Americans than Medicare or any private health insurer.17 Medicaid is now the
largest source of federal funds to states, accounting for 44% of all federal
funding that goes to states.18
As Medicaid has grown, it has become three programs in one: First, it is a
safety net health insurance program providing acute care physician, hospital,
and prescription drug coverage to children, parents, and pregnant women.
Medicaid now insures a quarter of all children in the U.S.19 It pays for 37% of
births in the U.S.20
Second, Medicaid is the nation’s primary source of financing for long-term
care, both institutional and community based services. Medicaid funds 46% of
all nursing home care.21 Medicaid “home and community based waiver”
programs serve the frail elderly, children and adults with physical and
developmental disabilities, and persons with HIV/AIDS.22 It is the leading
source of funding for community based long-term care services.23 Medicaid
also pays for over half of all publicly financed mental health care in the U.S.24
Third, Medicaid fills in gaps in Medicare. Although Medicare provides
near-universal coverage for people over age 65, it has substantial gaps in
coverage.25 Medicare provides almost no long-term care benefits, either in
nursing homes or community settings.26 It also has substantial deductibles and
co-payments.27 Until the enactment of Medicare Part D, Medicare provided no

17. VERNON SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, LOW MEDICAID
SPENDING GROWTH AMID REBOUNDING STATE REVENUES: RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE
MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY STATE FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007 5 (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7569.pdf.
18. Id.
19. News Release, Comm. on Fin., Floor Statement of U.S. Senator Max Baucus on Motion
to Instruct Conferees Regarding Medicaid Provisions in Budget Reconciliation Spending
Legislation (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/Bpress/2005press/
prb121205sub.pdf.
20. Daniel C. Vock, Medicaid: Biggest Insurer is a Budget Buster, STATELINE.ORG, Aug. 3,
2006, http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=131622.
21. Medicaid and Long-Term Care Services, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on
Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/Medicaid-and-Long-Term-Care-Services-PDF.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Jeffery A. Buck, Medicaid, Health Care Financing Trends and the Future of State-Based
Public Mental Health Services, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 969, 969 (2003), available at
http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/54/7/969.pdf.
Medicaid pays for both
clinical services and psychotropic medications. Id.
25. See PETER H. STOLOFF ET AL., CNA CORP. & INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, EVALUATION
OF THE TRICARE PROGRAM: FY 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS 5-16–5-22 (2002), available at
http://www.tricare.mil/ocfo/_docs/eval_report_fy02.pdf.
26. See id. at 5-17.
27. See id. at 5-16–5-18.
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outpatient prescription drug coverage.28 Medicaid fills these gaps for lowincome seniors who are “dually eligible” for full Medicaid benefits. Medicaid
also provides limited benefits—paying Medicare premiums, deductibles, and
co-payments—for Medicare recipients with incomes up to 120% of the FPL.29
Medicaid also fills gaps in private insurance coverage. Medicaid has never
mimicked private insurance coverage. Because Medicaid has always covered
more—and different—services than private insurers, it has been uniquely
positioned to grow to cover evolving safety net health care needs.30
In the acute care arena, Medicaid has always given states the option to
cover important medical care services excluded from 1965-era private
insurance and still not covered by many private plans—prescription drugs,
dental care, rehabilitation, and physical therapy services.31 Medicaid’s Early
Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) Program, added to the
federal Medicaid law in 1967, was the country’s first, and remains the most,
comprehensive preventive health and treatment program for children.32
Medicaid is the only health insurance that covers non-emergency
transportation to and from medical care.33
Medicaid also requires states to cover treatments for chronic diseases and
congenital conditions routinely excluded by private insurance.34 Private
insurance typically limits coverage to services necessary to “restore normal
functioning” following an “illness or injury.”35 The “illness or injury”

28. Medicare Learning Network, Important Information about Medicare Coverage of Drugs
Under Part B and the New Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage (Part D), and Vaccines
Administered in a Physician’s Office—The Ninth in the MLN Matters Series on the New
Prescription Drug Plans, MLN MATTERS (Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Washington,
D.C.), at 2, available at www.cms.hhs.gov/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/SE0507.pdf (last
visited Feb. 28, 2007).
29. Social
Security
Act
§§
1902(a)(10)(A)(i)(I),
1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(IV),
1902(a)(10)(A)(ii)(X), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (2003 & Supp. 2006).
30. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 16; SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 5.
31. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2003 & Supp. 2006) (listing Medicaid mandatory
services); id. § 1396d(a)(xiii)(4) (listing Medicaid optional services); STEVENS & STEVENS, supra
note 9, at 65–67; see also Kaiser Fam. Found., Medicaid: A Timeline of Key Developments
(1965–1969), http://www.kff.org/Medicaid/timeline/pf_65.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
32. See JANE PERKINS & SARAH SOMERS, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, TOWARD A
HEALTHY FUTURE: MEDICAID EARLY AND PERIODIC SCREENING, DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT
SERVICES FOR POOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 21–23 (2003).
33. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations: A Comparison of Medicaid and SCHIP
(Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured), Apr. 2006, at 3, fig. 4, http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/7488.pdf [hereinafter Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations].
34. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 16, at 12–14 (discussing this distinction
between Medicaid and private insurance). States have discretion to set reasonable limits on
Medicaid coverage, but states may not discriminate in the provision of medically necessary
services solely because of the type of condition or diagnosis. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.225 (2004).
35. See Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 16, at 13.
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requirement excludes treatments for cerebral palsy and other developmental
conditions which are defined as neither “illness” nor “injury.”36 The “restore
normal functioning” standard excludes treatments that improve quality of life,
but do not correct the underlying condition, such as occupational or speech
therapy for a child with autism. 37
Medicaid covers the long-term care services not provided by private health
insurance. Medicaid mandatory services include nursing home care,38 and
states have the option to cover intermediate care facilities, a crucial source of
residential care for children and adults with developmental disabilities.39 Over
the years, Congress has given states increasing options to use Medicaid to pay
for long-term care in community settings including coverage for personal care,
habilitation, case management, and a variety of other “home and community
based” services.40
In recognition that Medicaid insures the poorest Americans, Medicaid has
protected beneficiaries from the out of pocket costs typically imposed by
private insurers. While Medicare has always imposed substantial premiums,
deductibles and co-payments, Medicaid, as originally enacted, prohibited states
from imposing any premiums or cost-sharing on Medicaid recipients.41 In the
early 1980s, the Medicaid Act was amended to allow states to impose
“nominal” co-payments for most services for adults, but still prohibited copays for children’s services.42 In 2005, when private insurers were typically
imposing co-payments of $15 to $25 for physician visits and $11 to $38 for
prescription drugs,43 Medicaid capped co-payments at $0.50 to $3.00 per
service.44 Moreover, while Medicaid recipients are legally obligated to pay
cost-sharing amounts, providers have historically been prohibited from
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Bedrick v Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1996); see also
Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 16, at 13–14 (discussing these provisions).
38. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(xiii)(4) (2003 & Supp. 2006) (listing Medicaid optional
services); STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 65–67; see also Kaiser Fam. Found., supra note
31.
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(xiii)(4) (2003 & Supp. 2006) (listing Medicaid optional
services).
40. Id.
41. JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE’S MEDICINE: MEDICAID AND AMERICAN CHARITY
CARE SINCE 1965 50 (2006).
42. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396o(a)–(b) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53 (1986). Co-pays were also
prohibited for emergency services, family planning, hospice care, and institutionalized
individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a)–(b) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53 (1986). States were
specifically prohibited from imposing premiums or enrollment fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a)(1)
(1982).
43. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS:
2006 ANNUAL SURVEY 78, 124 (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/
upload/7527.pdf [hereinafter KFF/HRET 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY].
44. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o(a)(3) (2003); 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.54, 447.55 (2005).
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denying care, services, or drugs to Medicaid recipients who are unable to make
their co-payments.45
Initially, Medicaid’s safety net health insurance coverage was linked to
cash welfare payments: Medicaid was an additional benefit for single mothers
and their children receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
and aged, blind, or disabled persons receiving disability and old age
assistance.46 Over the last forty years, Medicaid has delinked from welfare and
expanded to cover more poor and near-poor Americans. However, the
Medicaid statute still uses categorical as well as income eligibility standards—
a holdover from its beginnings as an adjunct to welfare—and the primary
categories of Medicaid eligibility remain fairly close to those recognized by the
world of cash welfare.47
The federal Act now authorizes states to extend Medicaid coverage to
children and to adults who are parents, pregnant women, disabled, or elderly.48
Children’s eligibility now depends solely on family income rather than single
parent status, and states may use the State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) to extend Medicaid or other government-subsidized
coverage to children in families earning up to 200% of the federal poverty line
(FPL).49 For parents, categorical eligibility now extends beyond single parents
to all poor parents.50 However, federal law still prohibits states, absent a
waiver, from offering Medicaid coverage to non-parent, non-disabled adults.51
A few states have such waivers, but in forty-two states childless adults cannot
qualify for Medicaid.52

45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o(e) (2003).
46. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 9, at 61–62.
47. Social Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (2003 & Supp. 2006); id.
§ 1902(a)(47), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a; id. § 1920A, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-1a (2003).
48. Id. §§ 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii), 1902(aa), 1905(b)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a (2003 & Supp.
2006). The Medicaid Act also allows states to cover a few other discrete categories of adults,
including women seeking treatment for breast and cervical cancer. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396(aa)(3) (2003). Forty-four states have opted to provide Medicaid coverage for this treatment
for these low income uninsured women.
49. The federal Medicaid Act also requires states to cover children who are recipients of
adoption assistance and foster care under Title IV-E of the Social Services Act. 42 U.S.C.A §
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VIII) (2003 & Supp. 2006).
50. Title XIX only requires that states cover parents living in single parent households or
two-parent households in which the primary wage earner is unemployed. However, Title XIX
also gives states the option to cover all two-parent families. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u (2003 & Supp.
2006).
51. Marc Steinberg, Working Without A Net: The Health Care Safety Net Still Leaves
Millions of Low-Income Workers Uninsured, SPECIAL REPORT (Families USA, Washington,
D.C.), Apr. 2004, at 3, available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/Holes_2004_update_
revb622.pdf.
52. Id. at 1, 3.
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Federal Medicaid categorical eligibility rules remain mired in Medicaid’s
history as a welfare benefit, but Medicaid has changed: it is no longer a
program for welfare recipients. Twenty years ago, 75% of Medicaid recipients
were also receiving welfare benefits.53 Now, close to 75% of Medicaid
recipients receive no cash welfare assistance.54 Most Medicaid recipients are
children and parents in working families, but less than 20% of families with
Medicaid also receive Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or
other welfare assistance.55 Even among the elderly and disabled, where
Medicaid eligibility typically is linked to qualifying for Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), almost half of Medicaid recipients receive no SSI payments.56
Medicaid now finances health and long-term care for over 55 million
Americans.57 Medicaid provides health insurance to 42% of non-elderly
Americans with incomes below 100% of the FPL, and 27% of those with
incomes between 100% to 199% of the FPL.58 More than half (53%) of
Medicaid recipients are very poor, earning under 100% of the FPL, and 28%
are near poor, earning between 100% to 200% of the FPL.59

53. Id.
54. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 106TH CONG., 2000 GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS (Comm.Print 2000); see also EILEEN R. ELLIS ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON
MEDICAID & UNINSURED, MEDICAID ENROLLMENT IN 50 STATES: DECEMBER 2002 DATA
UPDATE (2003) (noting that as of December 1997, only 27.8% of Medicaid recipients also
received cash welfare).
55. VERNON K. SMITH & GREG MOODY, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, MEDICAID IN 2005:
PRINCIPLES & PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 7–8 (2005), available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/
0502MEDICAID.pdf.
56. Id.; see also ELLIS ET AL., supra note 54 (noting that as of December 1997, only 27.8%
of Medicaid recipients also received cash welfare).
57. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 5.
58. The Medicaid Program at a Glance, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid &
Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), May 2006, at fig. 4, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/7235.pdf (including as part of Medicaid figures SCHIP, other state programs, Medicare,
and military related coverage).
59. Kaiser Fam. Found., State Health Fact: Distribution of the Nonelderly with Medicaid by
Federal Poverty Level (FPL), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/ (Click 50 State Comparisons link;
Select Medicaid & SCHIP Category; Scroll down left panel and select Distribution by FPL under
Health Coverage & Uninsured: Nonelderly With Medicaid) (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
Commentators typically classify the “very poor” as people with incomes up to 100% of the FPL
and the “near-poor” as those with incomes between 100% to 200% of the FPL; they use the term
“low-income” when referring to all those earning below 200% of the FPL. Many refer to those
with incomes in the 200% to 400% FPL income range as moderate income. See infra text
accompanying notes 143–152 (providing an explanation of why the FPL understates the number
of Americans who fail to earn enough to meet their basic needs).
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Medicaid plays a crucial role in maintaining the nation’s health care
delivery system. With projected expenditures of over $300 billion in 2006,60
Medicaid supports 17% of all spending for personal health care, including 17%
of hospital care, 46% of nursing home costs, and 19% of prescription drug
costs.61 Medicaid accounts for 41% of revenues for safety net hospitals,62 and
one-third of the funding for community health centers, including federally
qualified health clinics serving medically underserved inner city areas as well
as rural health clinics and migrant clinics.63 Medicaid also helps finance
special education services in public schools by funding medically necessary
therapies provided in school settings.64
But Medicaid enrollment—particularly among parents and children—tends
to be countercyclical: when the economy is good and jobs are plentiful, lower
wage workers have more access to both jobs and employer-sponsored health
insurance. When the economy slows down and people lose jobs and health
benefits, workers and their children become eligible for Medicaid and turn to it
to tide them over until the economy picks up.
The countercyclical nature of Medicaid enrollment imposes a substantial
fiscal burden on states. State tax revenues—from income, sales, and payroll
taxes—decline when the economy slows down: just when states need
additional revenue, rather than less, to pay for the increased demand for
Medicaid.65 Medicaid is the second-largest expenditure in most states’ general
fund budgets, accounting for 18% of state revenue spending compared with
36% spent for elementary and secondary education. 66 States feel the pinch
when demand grows for even more Medicaid funding.
Medicaid’s countercyclical pattern hit states most recently during the 2001
recession. The slow economic recovery fueled a jump in Medicaid
enrollment,67 and total Medicaid spending spiked by more than 20% from 2000

60. Off. Mgmt. & Budget, The Nation’s Fiscal Outlook, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2006/outlook.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
61. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A PRIMER, KEY
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NATION’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM FOR LOWINCOME AMERICANS 8 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7334.cfm.
62. Diane Rowland & Rachel Garfield, Health Care for the Poor: Medicaid at Thirty-Five,
22 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 23, 23–24 (2000).
63. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Health Centers’ Role as Safety Net Providers for Medicaid
Patients and the Uninsured, ISSUE PAPER (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured,
Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2000, at 5–6, fig. 5, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2181index.cfm.
64. Alan Weil, There’s Something About Medicaid, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 13, 22–
23.
65. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 14.
66. Id. at 13–14.
67. VERNON SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, THE
CONTINUING MEDICAID BUDGET CHALLENGE: STATE MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH AND COST

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

412

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:403

to 2002, while state general revenue funding plummeted.68 States complained
that large Medicaid spending increases were outstripping state revenue
increases and crowding out other important state budget needs like education.69
Governors began describing Medicaid as a program that was
“unsustainable,” and the National Governors Association called for changes in
Medicaid to reduce the burden on state coffers.70 Some of their proposals are
familiar refrains in an ongoing debate about the relative roles that federal and
state governments should play in funding and administering the joint federalstate safety net program, and whether the federally funded Medicare program
should function more as a safety net insurer.71 Governors argue that the costs
of nursing home care for the nation’s elderly should be shifted to Medicare—a
federally funded program.72 They maintain that federally funded Medicare
should take over the costs now born by Medicaid for low-income “dually
eligible” seniors who depend on Medicaid coverage to pay Medicare
premiums, deductibles, and co-payments, and to other gaps in Medicare home
and community based coverage.73 The governors also propose removing
federal limits on categorical eligibility to allow states to cover non-disabled,
non-parent adults without a special Medicaid waiver.74 In general, state
governors appeal for increased federal law flexibility to allow states to
restructure their Medicaid programs via statutorily authorized optional service
and eligibility categories without being required to go through the Medicaid
waiver processes.75
State pleas for Medicaid reform through shifting costs from the states to
the federal government are familiar cries in the world of Medicaid reform, but
recently the National Governors Association took up a new refrain: demands
for increased state flexibility to shift more of the costs of care onto Medicaid
beneficiaries.76 Proposals for Medicaid cost-shifting to patients are fueled by
the same theories pushing consumer-directed health care in private insurance
as well as concerns that Medicaid is displacing employer-sponsored insurance.
CONTAINMENT IN FISCAL YEARS 2004 AND 2005 1 (2004), available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/7190.cfm; John Holahan & Arunabh Ghosh, Understanding the Recent Growth in
Medicaid Spending, 2000–2003, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 26, 2005, at W5–52 (Jan. 26, 2005),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.52v1.pdf.
68. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 5–6.
69. SMITH & MOODY, supra note 55, at 9.
70. See, e.g., NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, SHORT-RUN MEDICAID REFORM (Aug. 29, 2005),
available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0508MEDICAIDREFORM.PDF.
71. See id.
72. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, MEDICAID REFORM: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 2 (June 15,
2005), available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0506medicaid.pdf.
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 6–7.
75. Id.
76. SMITH & MOODY, supra note 55, at 14.
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II. SHIFTING COSTS TO PATIENTS: CONSUMER-DIRECTED MEDICAID
Proponents of consumer-directed health care worry that health insurance
shelters patients from the costs of health care causing patients to use
unnecessary services and drives up costs. 77 They warn that this problem is
particularly acute with Medicaid because Medicaid offers more generous
coverage than private health insurance and imposes little or only very small
patient cost-sharing. 78
These advocates point out that Medicaid recipients are no longer
exclusively the very poor welfare recipients that the program was designed to
serve in 1965, but predominately working parents and children.79 They argue
that working families on Medicaid should not get better health insurance
coverage than working families with private employer sponsored insurance.80
They worry that Medicaid discourages work because it is means-tested, and
thus recipients may forgo work because of fear of losing Medicaid coverage.81
They describe the program as “discouraging self-sufficiency and encouraging
dependence among beneficiaries”82 and fear that the existence of Medicaid
causes low-income workers to forgo purchasing private insurance and results
in employers of low-income workers failing to offer coverage.83
As in the private sector, consumer-directed Medicaid has emerged as a
new vision in an old Medicaid reform debate. A few states, including Utah
and Oregon, have Medicaid waivers to offer limited-benefit packages that
make Medicaid coverage more like private insurance.84 New Mexico,
Washington, and a handful of other states have approved Medicaid waivers to
increase patient cost-sharing.85 South Carolina submitted a waiver seeking
permission to give recipients the option of Medicaid high-deductible
catastrophic coverage with health savings accounts.86 Florida has an approved

77. Buntin, et al., supra note 1, at w516.
78. Cannon, supra note 4, at 9.
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 16–17.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Cannon, supra note 4, at 1.
83. Id. at 7.
84. Samantha Artiga & Cindy Mann, New Directions for Medicaid Section 1115 Waivers:
Policy Implications of Recent Waiver Activity, POL’Y BRIEF (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid &
Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2005, at 3, available at http://www.kff.org/Medicaid/
7286.cfm; Overview of the Utah Section 1115 Waiver, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on
Medicaid Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2004, at 1, available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/Utah-Section-1115-Waiver-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
85. Artiga & Mann, supra note 84, at 3.
86. Judith Solomon, Still Risky Business: South Carolina’s Revised Medicaid Waiver
Proposal (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 11, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.cbpp.org/1-11-06health.pdf.
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waiver to replace Medicaid health insurance with a defined-contribution
voucher.87
Congress has also jumped on the consumer-directed Medicaid bandwagon:
The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 gives states unprecedented
flexibility to cost shift to patients without federal waiver approval.88 Ushering
in possibly the most far-reaching changes to the Medicaid program since its
creation in 1965, the DRA gives states new authority to offer thinner benefit
packages that make Medicaid coverage more like private insurance, increase
patient cost-sharing, and allow states to transform Medicaid from a health
insurance program with defined benefits to a defined-contribution voucher
system.89 These provisions—along with Florida’s Medicaid Waiver that
allows the state to convert Medicaid into a voucher system—signal a new era
of experimentation with consumer-directed Medicaid.
A.

Increased Patient Cost-Sharing

The DRA adds a new section to the Medicaid Act that, for the first time,
gives states the option to impose substantial patient cost-sharing, including copayments, co-insurance, premiums, and deductibles. The Act removes
previous federal law requiring that premiums and cost-sharing be comparable
for all eligibility groups, allowing states to vary premiums and cost-sharing for
parents, children, the disabled, and the aged.
States may now impose cost-sharing as high as 20% of the cost of the
service for those with incomes above 150% of the FPL and up to 10% of cost
for those with incomes between 100% to 150% of the FPL.90 Those with
incomes below 100% of the FPL are still subject to the current “nominal” copayment limit of $0.50 to $3 per service, but these ceilings will increase
annually pegged to the medical care component of the Consumer Price

87. Florida Medicaid Waiver: Key Program Changes and Issues, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser
Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7443.pdf.
88. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006). For a discussion of the competing political
philosophies that resulted in the DRA, see Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting
Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5
(2006).
89. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).
90. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).
The DRA does not address those with incomes below 100% of the FPL, but the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has indicated that pre-DRA provisions limiting costsharing to “nominal” amounts remain in effect for these recipients. Letter from Dennis G. Smith,
Director for Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Director (June 16, 2006),
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/smdl/downloads/SMD061606.pdf. CMS indicates that it
will be providing further guidance on those with incomes below 100% through the administrative
rule-making process. Id.
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Index—a figure that has been rising twice as fast as the general inflation rate.91
States may also charge premiums to children and adults in families with
incomes over 150% of the FPL.92
States are still prohibited from charging co-pays for children’s preventive
care. Co-pays also remain prohibited for pregnancy-related services, family
planning, institutionalized individuals, emergency services, and treatment for
breast or cervical cancer.93
However, all other services can be subject to co-payments.94 States may
impose co-payments for sick child care for children up to age 5 with incomes
above 133% of the FPL and for children age 6 and older with incomes above
100% of the FPL.95 The DRA also authorizes states to create separate copayment requirements for non-preferred prescription drugs.96 States using this
prescription drug option may impose cost-sharing on all Medicaid recipients
including all children: No services or groups are exempt from cost-sharing for
non-preferred drugs.97
The DRA limits total out-of-pocket costs—premiums, deductibles, and copayments—to 5% of family income, computed on either a monthly or quarterly
basis.98 However, families, not the state, are responsible for keeping track of
when cost-sharing hits the 5% ceiling. This documentation can be difficult for
families, especially when income and expenses vary throughout the year.

91. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006); Leighton
Ku et al., The House Reconciliation Bill’s Provisions on Medicaid Co-Payments and Premiums:
Are They Mild or Harsh? (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 22, 2005,
available at http://www.cbpp.org/11-10-05health.pdf.
92. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).
The only groups exempted from premiums are pregnant women, those receiving hospice care,
institutionalized individuals, and women receiving breast or cervical cancer treatment. See id. §
6041(b)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1. Children in a “mandatory” category of Medicaid
eligibility are also exempt from premium requirements. See id. But except for children in foster
care, children who are mandatory eligibles live in families with incomes below 150% of the FPL,
i.e., children who are ages 0 to 5 with incomes up to 133% of the FPL and children 6 and older
with incomes up to 100% of the FPL. See id.
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1(b)(3)(B)(ii)–(ix).
94. Id. Children ages 0 to 5 with incomes below 133% of FPL and children age 6 and older
with income up to 100% of FPL are “mandatory” Medicaid eligibles and thus children exempt
from cost sharing requirements. See id.
95. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).
96. Id. § 6042(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1. Co-payments on non-prescription drugs
can be up to 20% of the cost of the drug for those with incomes over 150% of the FPL, and a
“nominal” amount (up to $3 per prescription) for those with incomes below 150% of the FPL,
including those with incomes below 100% of the FPL. Id. § 6042(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. §
1396o-1.
97. See id. § 6042.
98. Id. § 6041(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).
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The DRA also allows states to deny coverage and services to Medicaid
recipients who are unable to pay premiums and co-payments. States may
permit health care providers to deny care and services to Medicaid
beneficiaries who have unpaid co-payments—even in circumstances in which
the recipient is financially unable to make payment.99 The DRA also allows
states to terminate Medicaid coverage for failure to pay premiums for sixty
days.100
Kentucky has already taken advantage of the DRA’s new provisions and
implemented state plan amendments to increase Medicaid cost-sharing.101
There, most non-elderly adults—parents, pregnant women, and adults with
disabilities—are now subject to increased co-pays, a $225 annual out of pocket
maximum for prescription drugs, and a separate $225 maximum for other
medical services.102
B.

Limited Benefits

The DRA also gives states a new option to place children and parents in
limited-benefit Medicaid plans with coverage similar to employer-sponsored
insurance rather than Medicaid’s more comprehensive coverage.103 A number
99. See id. § 6041(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006). For detailed analysis of the
new premium and cost-sharing provisions, see The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005: Congress
Targets Beneficiaries for Cuts, 224 HEALTH ADVOC. 1, 21–25 (2006), available at
http://www.healthlaw.org/library.cfm (Click link to Medicaid Page; Click link to Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005; Scroll to Document).
100. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).
101. KyHealth Choices Medicaid Reform: Key Program Changes and Questions, MEDICAID
FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006, at 1–2,
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7530.pdf [hereinafter KyHealth Choices].
102. Id. Co-pays are not imposed for preventive services. Id. at 2.
103. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6044, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-7 (West 2006); see also
Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Director of the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, to the
State Medicaid Director, at 5 (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/smdl/
downloads/SMD06008.pdf; Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Roadmap to Medicaid
Reform: New Options to Improve and Expand Insurance Coverage for Acute Care Needs (State
Medicaid Director Letters), at 1 (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/smdl/downloads/
Rvacutecare.pdf. States may use benchmark coverage for all Medicaid-eligible children and for
parents, elderly, and pregnant women who are not “mandatory” eligibles under the federal statute.
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005: Implications for Medicaid (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid &
Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2006 [hereinafter Implications for Medicaid], available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7465.pdf. Individuals who qualify for Medicare as well as
Medicaid and those with long-term care needs are exempt from benchmark coverage. Id. Parents
with incomes as low as 9% of the FPL fall above Medicaid mandatory eligibility levels and could
be moved into mandatory benchmark coverage. Id. For an excellent discussion of issues raised
by Medicaid limited benefits, see Sara Rosenbaum, Defined-Contribution Plans and LimitedBenefit Arrangements: Implications for Medicaid Beneficiaries, POL’Y BRIEF (Geo. Wash. U.
Sch. Pub. Health & Health Servs.), Sept. 13, 2006, http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/healthpolicy/
chsrp/downloads/Rosenbaum_AHIP_FNL_ 091306.pdf.
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of states have used Medicaid waivers to expand Medicaid eligibility using
limited benefit plans.104 However, the DRA gives states the option to reduce
coverage to presently eligible groups through limited benefit plans, while
requiring states to continue to use the more complicated waiver process to
obtain federal permission to expand coverage through limited benefit plans.105
Limited-benefit plans are already a state option in the SCHIP, the safety
net health insurance program for children in families with incomes above
Medicaid levels, typically between 100% to 200% of the FPL.106 The DRA
allows states to use limited-benefit plans for lower income Medicaid
children—even those with incomes below 100% of the FPL.107 It also allows
limited-benefit plans for Medicaid-eligible parents and pregnant women who
are not “mandatory” eligibles under federal law.108 In some states this includes
parents with incomes as low as 9% of the FPL.109 Moreover, CMS has
interpreted the DRA to allow states to offer all Medicaid recipients the choice
of enrolling in limited plans rather than traditional Medicaid.110 Idaho,
Kentucky, and West Virginia have already used this increased flexibility to
reduce benefits, and enroll children and their parents in limited-benefit
Medicaid plans.111
Limited-benefit plans are typically referred to as “benchmark” coverage
because plans must be similar to policies offered in the private market.112 The
DRA gives states a wide variety of plans they may benchmark against: the
standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plan offered under the Federal Employee
Health Benefits Plan, a health plan offered by the state to its own employees,
or a plan offered by an HMO with the largest commercial enrollment in the
state.113 Benchmark equivalent coverage can also be any other coverage

104. See Rosenbaum, supra note 103, at 5.
105. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6041(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396o-1 (West 2006).
106. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations, supra note 33, at 3.
107. Implications for Medicaid, supra note 103, at 4–5.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Letter from Dennis G. Smith, supra note 103, at 3; Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., supra note 103, at 2; see Judith Solomon, The Illusion of Choice: Vulnerable Medicaid
Beneficiaries Being Placed in Scaled-Back “Benchmark” Benefit Packages (Ctr. on Budget &
Pol’y Priorities, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 14, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.cbpp.org/9-1406health.pdf.
111. KyHealth Choices, supra note 101, at 1–2; West Virginia Medicaid State Plan
Amendment: Key Program Changes and Questions, MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on
Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006, at 1, available at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/7529.pdf; Rosenbaum, supra note 103, at 5.
112. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations, supra note 33, at 3.
113. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 103, at 1.
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proposed by the state that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) determines provides “appropriate” coverage.114
Limited-benefit plans reduce Medicaid coverage. Even the most generous
benchmark plans do not offer key services covered by traditional Medicaid:
family planning, case management, personal care services, non-emergency
transportation to and from medical care, nursing home care, intermediate care
facilities for children and adults with developmental disabilities, and home and
community based services.115 Moreover, since the DRA gives states the option
to benchmark to any “health plan offered by the state to its own employees,”
states now have the option to force Medicaid-eligible parents and children into
“bare bones” catastrophic coverage with a high deductible if such an option is
available to state employees.116
Moreover, benchmark private insurance plans use more restrictive
definitions of “medical necessity” than does traditional Medicaid.117 Private
plans place limits on rehabilitation services like physical, occupational, and
speech therapy and home health services that are not permitted under
traditional Medicaid rules.118
Private insurance does not cover the outreach, education, and screening
services provided by Medicaid’s EPSDT program. The DRA requires that
children enrolled in benchmark plans be provided EPSDT services as “wrap
around” services, i.e., as an additional benefit to their limited-benefit plan.119
However, it is unclear how well children will be able to access EPSDT
services offered separate and apart from their benchmark plan.

114. Id. Benchmark equivalent coverage must include inpatient and outpatient hospital
services, physician services, laboratory and x-ray services, well-baby and well-child care
including immunizations, and other appropriate prevention services. Letter from Dennis G.
Smith, supra note 103, at 4. Benchmark coverage must also provide coverage for rural health
clinic and federally qualified health center services for all recipients. Deficit Reduction Act of
2005 § 6044(a)(4).
115. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations, supra note 33, at 3.
116. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6044(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. 1396u-7 (West 2006)
(explaining that benchmark coverage includes any “plan that is offered and generally available to
State employees”).
117. Health Coverage for Low-Income Populations, supra note 33, at 3.
118. Id. at 3.
119. Id. The DRA also requires that states ensure that both child and adult beneficiaries with
benchmark coverage have access to rural health clinics and federally qualified health center
(FQHC) services. Letter from Dennis G. Smith, supra note 103, at 5.
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C. High Deductibles + Health Savings Accounts
The DRA also introduces high-deductible coverage combined with health
savings accounts (HASs) to Medicaid, authorizing the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to allow up to ten states to set up Health Opportunity Account
(HOA) demonstrations.120 To many, high-deductible insurance policies
combined with HSAs are the signature form of consumer-directed health
care.121 High deductibles + HSAs are designed to give consumers the financial
incentive to keep their health care costs below the amount in their HSAs. Not
only are consumers allowed to retain money remaining in the account at the
end of the year but these plans also typically create a “donut hole” gap between
the annual HSA deposited amount and catastrophic health insurance coverage.
States participating in the HOA demonstration will be allowed to
voluntarily enroll Medicaid-eligible parents and children in coverage that
combines high deductibles + HSAs.122 States may claim federal Medicaid
matching funds for HOA deposits of up to $2,500 per adult and $1,000 per
child.123 States must provide participating families with high-deductible
Medicaid coverage, but the DRA authorizes states to impose a donut hole of up
to $250 per adult and $100 per child beyond the funds in the HOA before
Medicaid coverage begins.124
Prior to passage of the DRA, South Carolina was negotiating a Section
1115 waiver to give recipients the option of Medicaid-funded, risk-adjusted
“personal health accounts” in lieu of traditional Medicaid.125 While South
Carolina is revamping its plan in light of new DRA provisions, the original
proposal provides a glimpse of how states may try to structure HOA
demonstrations.
Under South Carolina’s proposal, once an individual’s HSA is exhausted,
he or she must cover a donut hole of $250 before being eligible for
catastrophic coverage through a Medicaid-approved private managed care plan
or Preferred Provider Organization (PPO).126 Each personal health account is
120. Implications for Medicaid, supra note 103, at 6.
121. See also Michele Melden, Guarding Against the High Risk of High Deductible Health
Plans: A Proposal for Regulatory Protections, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 403, 403 (2006); see,
e.g., Carolyn M. Clancy & Anne K. Gauthier, Consumer-Driven Health Care—Beyond Rhetoric
with Research and Experience, 39 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1049 (2004); .
122. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6082(b)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-8 (West 2006).
123. Id. § 6082(d)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. 1396u–8 (West 2006).
124. Deductibles cannot exceed 110% of the amount contributed by the state. Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 § 6082(c)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-8 (West 2006). These maximum
amounts are subject to be increased based upon inflation. Id.
125. ROBERT M. KERR, S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SOUTH CAROLINA
MEDICAID CHOICE: AN 1115 DEMONSTRATION WAIVER PROPOSAL 10 (2005),
http://www.dhhs.state.sc.us/Internet/pdf/SCMC.pdf. For descriptions of other aspects of the
South Carolina waiver proposal, see Solomon, supra note 86, at 1.
126. Solomon, supra note 86, at 1.
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risk-rated based on the person’s age, sex, eligibility category, and (in some
cases) health status.127 However, fears are that risk rating systems are still
rather inaccurate, and individuals often have unanticipated medical problems,
making it likely that participants will exhaust their accounts and run into the
$250 donut hole.128
D. Vouchers
The DRA does not give states the option to use Medicaid vouchers, but
Florida has an approved Section 1115 waiver to transform the state’s Medicaid
program into a Medicaid voucher system.129 While health spending accounts
provide consumers with money with which to directly purchase health care,
health insurance vouchers give consumers a set dollar amount to be used
toward the purchase of health insurance coverage.130 Both are forms of
defined contribution health plans that place the consumer at increased financial
risk when compared with traditional health insurance. HSAs place consumers
at risk that their health care costs will be less than the amount in their health
spending account. Health insurance vouchers place consumers at risk that their
voucher will not cover the cost of adequate health insurance.
Florida’s voucher program assigns each Medicaid recipient a “riskadjusted premium” based on their health status and historic use of Medicaid
services.131 Medicaid-eligible Floridians can use the vouchers to purchase
health insurance from Medicaid-approved managed-care plans, or through
employer-sponsored or individual insurance coverage.132 Recipients who use
127. Id. at 6.
128. Id. at 6–7. South Carolina’s Section 1115 Waiver proposal would also allow recipients
to use the funds as a voucher: (1) to purchase an individual private insurance policy, through a
Managed Care Organization or other entity, (2) to purchase coverage through a Medicaid PPO
“medical home network,” or (3) to purchase employer-sponsored insurance. Id. Recipients
opting to purchase PPO “medical home network” coverage would be charged their entire personal
health accounts (PHAs). Id. With the other three options, recipients could keep any amount in
their PHA remaining after paying their health insurance premium and out-of-pockets costs. Id.
Private insurance plans would not be required to provide the range of benefits now offered under
Medicaid. Id.
129. Gov. Jeb Bush, Market Principles: The Right Prescription for Medicaid, 17 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 33 (2006); Joan Alker, Understanding Florida’s Medicaid Waiver Application,
POL’Y BRIEF (Winter Park Health Found., Winter Park, Fla.), Sept. 2005, at 4, available at
http://www.wphf.org/pubs/briefpdfs/Medicaid5.pdf.
130. Alker, supra note 129, at 4.
131. FLA. MEDICAID REFORM, FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., APPLICATION FOR
1115 RESEARCH AND DEMONSTRATION WAIVER 8 (2005), available at http://www.fccmh.org/
content/1/file/medicaid_reform_waiver_final_101905.pdf.
132. Id. at 4–5, 30–33; see also SARA ROSENBAUM & ANNE MARKUS, COMMONWEALTH
FUND, THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY MEDICAID PROVISIONS
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT SERVICES (2005), available
at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Rosenbaum_DRA_Medicaid_ provisions_958.pdf; Alker, supra
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their vouchers for private insurance are responsible for any premium costs in
excess of their voucher, all patient cost-sharing such as deductibles and copayments, and all costs of uncovered services.133
For Medicaid-approved plans, Florida is giving the private plans more
flexibility to design benefit packages that differ from each other and from
Florida’s previous Medicaid coverage.134 The state hopes to generate a variety
of plan types to better meet the special needs of various types of Medicaid
beneficiaries, particularly those with serious and chronic health problems.135
However, the state does not guarantee that a recipient’s voucher will be
sufficient to purchase the plan that best meets his or her specific medical
needs.136 Neither does the state have any financial responsibility if a Medicaid
approved plan’s benefit package does not cover unanticipated medical needs
that arise during the enrollment year.137
Moreover, all adults except pregnant women who purchase state approved
private Medicaid plans will be subject to an annual maximum benefit limit on
covered services.138 When the cost of care reaches this limit, neither the state

note 129 (describing various aspects of the Florida waiver); Cindy Mann & Samantha Artiga,
New Developments in Medicaid Coverage: Who Bears Financial Risk and Responsibility?, ISSUE
PAPER (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), June 2006, at 1, available
at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7507.pdf; The Medicaid Program at a Glance, supra note
58.
133. FLA. MEDICAID REFORM, supra note 131, at 33.
134. Id. at 17. Plans must cover all services that are mandatory under federal Medicaid law,
but there is increased flexibility to determine which optional Medicaid services to cover and
increased discretion to determine the amount, duration, and scope of covered services, including
setting numerical limits on services such as physician visits or prescription drug coverage. Id.
Benefit packages must meet the state’s sufficiency standard which requires that “the overall level
of services provided is appropriate for the premium received.” FLA. MEDICAID REFORM,
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, available at http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/medicaid_reform/
implementationplan/implementationplan_11-29-05.pdf; see Mann & Artiga, supra note 132, at
21, n.16 (“Neither the waiver nor the state’s implementation plan for the waiver requires coverage
of all currently covered optional services; state legislation enacted to implement the waiver may
require optional services be covered but not any particular scope of coverage.”).
135. See, e.g., Fla. Medicaid Reform, Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., Medicaid Reform
Expansion, http://ahca.myflorida.com/Medicaid/medicaid_reform/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
136. For example, the following sources provide comprehensive detail about the Florida 1115
waiver and make no mention of a guarantee: FLA. MEDICAID REFORM, supra note 131; FLA.
MEDICAID REFORM, supra note 134. “Neither the waiver nor the state’s implementation plan for
the waiver requires coverage of all currently covered optional services; state legislation enacted to
implement the waiver may require optional services be covered but not any particular scope of
coverage.” Mann & Artiga, supra note 132, at 21 n.16. “[T]he overall level of services provided
is appropriate for the premium received.” Id. at 10.
137. See Mann & Artiga, supra note 132, at 1.
138. FLA. MEDICAID REFORM, supra note 131, at 23. Children will also be required to enroll
in the new system, but plans offered to children are not subject to the maximum cap and such
plans must offer the full range of Medicaid EPSDT services. Id. at 17.
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nor the Medicaid approved private plan is responsible for covering further
medical costs.139 Florida officials estimate that annually 5% of Medicaid
recipients—those with the most serious chronic and disabling medical
conditions—will max out their benefit coverage.140
Thus, consumer-directed Medicaid is born: higher cost-sharing, limited
benefits, high deductibles + HSAs, and vouchers purposefully shift the cost of
medical care to Medicaid patients. This cost-shifting seeks to incentivize
Medicaid recipients to be prudent consumers of health care, but it also shifts
the financial risk to low-income families who have few resources to absorb
these additional costs.
III. THE VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM
A triumvirate of ideas governs consumer-directed Medicaid: First,
Medicaid is no longer a safety net for the “truly needy,” but a program that
includes those who should be able to purchase health insurance or health care
in the private market. Second, the working families who now make up a
majority of Medicaid recipients do need the comprehensive coverage that
Medicaid provides: coverage that mimics employer-sponsored insurance
should be adequate. Third, Medicaid costs are high and quality is low because
Medicaid recipients are shielded from the cost of care. Each of these ideas
rests on false premises.
First, it is not just the very poor who are priced out of private insurance,
low- and even moderate-income working Americans can no longer afford
private insurance premiums and need some kind of safety net health insurance.
Since 2000, the percentage of firms offering health insurance has slipped from
69% to 61%: Only 42% of workers earning less than $20,000 a year have an
employer who offers health benefits.141 Among firms that offer health
insurance, premiums have skyrocketed 87% while workers’ wages have
increased by only 22%.142

139. Id. at 21–23.
140. Robert Pear, U.S. Gives Florida A Sweeping Right to Curb Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 2005, at A1.
141. KFF/HRET 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 43, at 35. Also, higher income workers
are more likely to work for employers who offer health insurance. Id. Sixty-five percent of
employers who pay two-thirds of their work force at least $20,000 annually offer health benefits,
but only 42% of employers who pay two-thirds of their work force $20,000 or less annually offer
health benefits. Id.
142. See id. at 32.
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Increases in Health Insurance Premiums
Compared to Other Indicators, 1988-2005

Source: Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research and Educational Trust,
Employer Health Benefits: 2005 Annual Survey 1 (2005).

In 2006, a full-time minimum wage worker earned about $11,000 a year,
but the annual premium for employer-sponsored health insurance averaged
$11,480 for a family of four and $4,242 for single coverage.143 Even with an
employer subsidy, the average worker’s share of the premium was $2,973 a
year for family coverage and $627 for single.144 The issue is not that Medicaid
has expanded beyond the “truly needy,” but that more American families
“truly need” an affordable alternative to private insurance.
In 2004, the median family of four had to earn $36,120 just to cover basic
costs for housing, utilities, food, transportation, child care, state and local
taxes, and other necessities such as telephone, clothes, and household
supplies.145 In higher cost cities, the same family needed between $40,000 and
$50,000 to cover these basic needs.146 On average, U.S. families must earn
about 200% of the FPL to cover basic expenses, and more than half of
Americans live in cities where it takes between 200% and 300% of the FPL to
cover basic expenses. And these figures do not include health care premiums
or out-of-pocket costs.

143. Id. at 18.
144. Id. at 60.
145. See Economic Policy Institute Basic Family Budget Calculator (2004), available at
http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/datazone_fambud_budget.
146. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

424

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:403

Basic Budget for Family of Four, 2004 Estimates147
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Contrary to popular perception, people who earn double and even triple the
FPL are “truly needy” in today’s economy. The FPL uses a formula developed
in the early 1960s by Molly Orshansky, an employee of the Social Security
Administration.148 In the mid-1950s American families spent about one-third
147. Id.; Sylvia Allegretto, Basic Family Budgets: Working Families’ Incomes Fail to Meet
Living Expenses Around the U.S., Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper, at 3–4 (2004), available at
http://www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/165/bp165.pdf. Costs are for a basic family budget.
Housing costs are based on the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s fair market
rents for the lower 40th percentile. Food costs are based on the USDA’s low-cost plan to achieve
nutritionally adequate diets. Transportation expenses are based on the costs of owning and
operating a car for work and other necessary trips drawn from the National Travel Household
Survey by metropolitan or rural area. Child care is based on center-based child care or family
child care centers for 4 to 8 year-olds as reported by the Children’s Defense Fund. Other
necessities include: the cost of telephone, clothing, personal care expenses, household supplies,
school supplies, etc. from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Taxes are for tax year 2004 as
computed by Citizens for Tax Justice and include federal tax credits for children and the earned
income tax credit. Taxes include federal personal income taxes, federal Social Security and
Medicare payroll taxes (worker payments only), and state and local income or wage taxes. The
2004 federal poverty guideline for a family of four in the continental U.S. was $18,850. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., The 2004 HHS Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/
04poverty.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
148. See Mollie Orshansky, Children of the Poor, SOC. SEC. BULL., July 1963, at 3; see also
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Frequently Asked Questions Related to Poverty Guidelines
and Poverty, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/faq.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter
Poverty Guidelines FAQ] (describing the differences between the federal poverty thresholds and
the federal poverty guidelines). The correct term is “federal poverty guideline,” but the figures
are typically referred to as the federal poverty level or federal poverty line. See U.S. Dep’t of
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of their after-tax income on food, so Orshansky calculated poverty thresholds
by multiplying the cost of the United States Department of Agriculture’s least
expensive food plan by three to estimate the costs of basic household
expenses.149 Orshansky’s formula is still used to calculate the FPL, but now
food costs reflect only about one-sixth of household expenses resulting in an
FPL that underestimates basic living costs by almost one-half.150

Federal Poverty Line, 2006
Federal
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Source: U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., The 2006 HHS Poverty Guidelines,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/06poverty.shtml.

Thus, even small premiums can price families earning less than 300% of
the FPL out of insurance: States that have imposed Medicaid and SCHIP
premiums well below the 5% of income cap allowed by the DRA have seen

Health & Hum. Servs., Poverty Guidelines, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/06poverty.shtml (last
visited Feb. 28, 2007). The federal poverty threshold is the original version of the federal poverty
measure. Poverty Guidelines FAQ, supra. It is used mainly for statistical purposes, i.e.,
estimating the number of people living below that threshold each year. See Off. Mgmt. &
Budget, Statistical Policy Directive No. 14: Definition of Poverty for Statistical Purposes (May
1978), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/povmeas/ombdir14.html. The federal
poverty guidelines are issued each year in the Federal Register by the Department of Health and
Human Services and are used for administrative purposes to determine financial eligibility for
certain federal programs. Poverty Guidelines FAQ, supra.
149. Orshansky, supra note 148, at 3, 8–10; Poverty Guidelines FAQ, supra note 148. In
1965 Orshansky expanded and adjusted her poverty measures to encompass virtually all family
sizes. See Mollie Orshansky, Who’s Who Among the Poor: A Demographic View of Poverty,
SOC. SEC. BULL., July 1965, at 3; see also Gordon M. Fisher, The Development and History of
the Poverty Thresholds, SOC. SEC. BULL., Winter 1992, at 3 (discussing the origins of the poverty
levels).
150. See Federal Poverty Guidelines FAQ, supra note 148. The FPLs are updated annually to
account for increases in the Consumer Price Index, but the underlying formula is still
Orshansky’s, i.e., multiply the cost of the USDA thrifty food plan by three. Id. For criticisms of
the methodology, see NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, MEASURING POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH 26–31
(Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., 1995).
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substantial drops in enrollment.151 An Urban Institute analysis, based on these
and other states’ experiences, concludes that premiums equal to 5% of income
will price over 80% of potentially eligible families out of Medicaid.152

Premiums as a Percent of Income
Source: Medicaid and Budget Reconciliation: Options and Implications of Savings Proposals
(Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2005, at 3.

Second, employer-sponsored insurance increasingly offers inadequate
financial protection for low-income families: Even when low-income families
are able to obtain private insurance through generous employer subsidies, outof-pocket costs can be staggering. In 2006, the average deductible for
employer-sponsored single-coverage was $352 for HMO coverage, $553 for
point-of-service (POS), and $1,715 for high-deductible plans.153 Co-payments

151. See, e.g., Leighton Ku & Victoria Wachino, The Effect of Increased Cost Sharing in
Medicaid: A Summary of Research Findings (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Washington,
D.C.), July 7, 2005, available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-31-05health2.pdf; Samantha Artiga &
Molly O’Malley, Increasing Premiums and Cost-Sharing in Medicaid and SCHIP: Recent State
Experiences, ISSUE PAPER (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), May
2005, at 4, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7322.cfm.
152. Leighton Ku & Teresa Coughlin, Sliding-Scale Premium Health Insurance Programs:
Four States’ Experiences, 36 INQUIRY 471, 477 (1999).
153. KFF/HRET 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 43, at 32, 78–79, 111. Fifty-five (54.8)
percent of workers must pay a general deductible. Sixty percent of workers are covered by PPOs,
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typically ranged from $15 to $20 for physician visits and $11 to $38 for
prescription drugs.154
Because private insurance imposes the same cost-sharing on all, these
burdens fall more heavily on low-wage workers and the sick, and most heavily
on those who are both low-wage and sick. Workers with employer-insured
insurance earning less than $10,000 per year spent on average 34% of their
income on health insurance deductibles and co-payments.155 In comparison,
workers earning over $50,000 a year spent only 4% of their income on medical
out-of-pocket costs.156
Workers with ESI, Personal Out-of-Pocket
Medical Expenses, 2002
34.0%

4.0%

Annual Income
Annual
Income

Annual Income
Income
Annual

< $10,000

≥ $50,000

Source: Paul Fronstin, Commonwealth Fund, Worker’s Health Insurance, Trends,
Issues and Options to Expand Coverage (2006) (does not include premiums).

Medicaid coverage benchmarked to private plans is likely to leave
Medicaid recipients paying even higher percentages of income on out-ofpocket medical expenses: Medicaid recipients get a double whammy when it
comes to out-of-pocket costs—they are both poorer and sicker than most
Americans with private insurance. More than half (53%) of Medicaid

13% by POS, 20% by HMOs, 4% by high-deductible plans, and 3% by conventional plans. See
id. The prevalence of general deductibles by plan type is as follows: 69% of PPOs impose
general deductibles on workers, 32% of POS, 12% of HMOs and 100% of high deductible and
conventional plans. Id. at 81–82.
154. Id. at 121. Prescription drug co-pays typically are tiered averaging $11 for generics, $24
for preferred drugs, and $38 for non-preferred drugs. Id. at 121.
155. PAUL FRONSTIN, COMMONWEALTH FUND, WORKER’S HEALTH INSURANCE: TRENDS,
ISSUES AND OPTIONS TO EXPAND COVERAGE 8 (2006) (explaining that figures are for worker
income and worker expenses and do not include family income or medical spending), available at
http:www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Fronstin_workershltins_908.pdf.
156. Id.
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recipients are very poor, earning under 100% of the FPL, and another 28% are
near poor, with incomes between 100% to 200% of the FPL.157 Most children
and almost half of parents enrolled in Medicaid have serious functional health
limitations.158
Even now, Medicaid recipients are not insulated from the cost of medical
care: Adults on Medicaid pay a larger share of their income on out-of-pocket
medical expenses than do higher income privately insured Americans.159 In
2002, non-disabled working adults with Medicaid coverage spent on average
2.4% of their income on out-of-pocket medical expenses, and disabled adult
Medicaid recipients spent almost 6% (5.6%) out-of-pocket for medical care.160
In contrast, privately insured adults earning over 200% of the FPL spent on
average less than 1%—only 0.7% on out-of-pocket medical costs.161
Percentage of Family Income Spent on
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Medicaid Beneficiaries are Substantial and Growing (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y
Priorities,
Washington, D.C.), May 31, 2005, at fig. 2.
Medicaid

157. Kaiser Fam. Found., supra note 59.
158. ROSENBAUM & MARKUS, supra note 132.
159. Leighton Ku & Matthew Broaddus, Out-Of-Pocket Medical Expenses For Medicaid
Beneficiaries Are Substantial and Growing (Ctr. on Budget & Pol’y Priorities, Washington,
D.C.), May 31, 2005, at 2, fig. 2, available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-31-05health.pdf.
160. Id.
161. Id. Studies also demonstrate that in recent years, the share of Medicaid beneficiaries’
income that is consumed by out-of-pocket medical expenses has been rising twice as fast as their
incomes. Id. at 2, fig. 1.
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In stark contrast to the claims of consumer-driven health care, Medicaid’s
generous benefit package has not resulted in higher costs: Medicaid actually
costs less per enrollee than employer-provided health insurance. In 2003,
Medicaid spending averaged $1,872 per working parent and $1,467 per
child,162 while the average cost for single employer-sponsored insurance was
$3,383.163 Medicaid can insure two people—a parent and child—for less than
the cost of employer-sponsored insurance for just the parent.
Medicaid has also done a superb job of holding down per capita spending
increases. The growth in Medicaid spending for services is only about onethird the growth in overall private insurance spending and only half the
increase in premium costs for employer-sponsored insurance.164 From 2000 to
2004, Medicaid per capita spending for acute care services rose 6.4% while
long-term care costs rose only 4.2%.165 In comparison, private insurance per
capita costs—primarily for acute care services—rose 9.5% for all Americans
and 12.2% for those with employer-sponsored health insurance.166
While low Medicaid reimbursement rates are one explanation for lower
Medicaid costs, Medicaid also delivers lower cost coverage because it has
lower administrative overhead. State Medicaid programs report administrative
costs of only 4% to 6%, compared with private HMO administrative costs of
8% to 12% and commercial health insurer administrative costs of 15% to
20%.167
Neither has Medicaid’s more comprehensive benefit package resulted in
unnecessary medical care. No data substantiates claims that Medicaid
recipients overuse medical care. To the contrary, one study of thirteen states
found that adult Medicaid beneficiaries use about the same level of health care
services as adults with private health insurance who have higher cost-

162. Kaiser
Fam.
Found.,
Medical
Payments
per
Enrollee,
FY2003,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/ (Click 50 State Comparisons Link; Select Medicaid & SCHP
from left column; Click Payments by Enrollee Group, FY2003 in left column under Medicaid
Spending).
163. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS:
2003 ANNUAL SURVEY 32 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/KaiserFamily-Foundation-2003-Employer-Health-Benefits-Survey-Full-Report.pdf
[hereinafter
KFF/HRET 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY].
164. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 21.
165. Id.
166. KFF/HRET 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY, supra note 163; see also SMITH ET AL., supra note
17, at 21.
167. SMITH & MOODY, supra note 55, at 8.
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sharing.168 Another study of mothers in low-incomes families found similar
results.169
Shifting costs to Medicaid recipients will not result in better quality care: It
will result in poorer care and worse outcomes. Cost-sharing is perhaps the
most studied aspect of the Medicaid program: a plethora of research concludes
that even modest co-payments—far below those contemplated by the DRA—
cause Medicaid patients to forego necessary, not just excess, medical care.170
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, considered the landmark study of
cost-sharing, found that although higher patient cost-sharing did not adversely
affect the health of middle and higher income people, cost-sharing did create
barriers to access and poorer health outcomes for lower income patients.171 A
recent study in Minnesota found that when the state imposed tiered Medicaid
drug co-payments of $1 for generic drugs and $3 for brand name drugs—far
below amounts authorized by the DRA—slightly more than half of Medicaid
patients using a public hospital reported being unable to fill prescriptions
because of co-payment charges.172 About one-third of those who went without
prescription drugs had more serious health problems, like strokes, diabetes
problems, or asthma attacks, and required expensive emergency room care or
hospital admission.173

168. Teresa A. Coughlin et al., Assessing Access to Care Under Medicaid: Evidence for the
Nation and Thirteen States, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1073, 1081 (2005).
169. Sharon K. Long et al., How Well Does Medicaid Work in Improving Access to Care?, 40
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 39, 55 (2005).
170. See, e.g., Artiga & O’Malley, supra note 151, at 3; Ku & Wachino, supra note 151, at
11; Bill J. Wright, et al., The Impact of Increased Cost-Sharing on Medicaid Enrollees, 24
HEALTH AFF. 1106 (2005).
171. JOSEPH NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT 183–243 (1993). The RAND study found that co-payments led to a marked
reduction in “episodes of effective care” among low-income adults and children. As a
consequence, health status was poorer among low-income adults and children who were reported
to make co-payments to obtain care than among comparable low-income adults and children who
were not subject to payments. Id. at 251; see also JONATHON GRUBER, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
THE ROLE OF CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE: LESSONS FROM THE RAND
HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/
insurance/upload/7566.pdf.
172. Melody Mendiola et al., Hennepin County Medical Center (Minneapolis, Minn.),
Medicaid Patients Perceive Copays as a Barrier to Medication Compliance, Presentation at the
Society of General Internal Medicine National Conference (May 2005).
173. Id. A Canadian study found that after Quebec imposed co-payments for prescription
drugs on adults who were receiving welfare, these individuals filled fewer prescriptions for
essential medications and emergency room use subsequently increased 14% among these adults.
Robyn Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated with Prescription Drug Cost-Sharing Among
Poor and Elderly Persons, 285 JAMA 421 (2001). The number of “adverse events” such as
death and hospitalization rose by 78%. Id.
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In fact, studies show that Medicaid provides better quality preventive
services for children than does private health insurance.174 Advocates of
consumer-driven Medicaid taut SCHIP benchmark coverage as a model for
redesigning Medicaid co-payments and benefits, but studies show that
Medicaid-like SCHIP coverage results in better quality care—and better health
outcomes—than does SCHIP coverage that is benchmarked to private
insurance.175
Finally, increased Medicaid cost-sharing puts financial pressures on low
income families already juggling tight budgets. In Oregon, more than a third
of Medicaid recipients subject to increased Medicaid cost-sharing reported
cutting back on food to pay for medical costs.176 Another study reported that
nearly 30% of families with incomes up to 200% of the FPL had at least one
critical hardship such as missed meals, an eviction, utilities disconnected,
doubling up in housing, or inability to access needed medical care.177 Over
72% of these families reported at least one serious hardship such as worries
about food, missed rent or mortgage payments, reliance on the emergency
room as the main source of medical care, or inadequate child care
arrangements.178
CONCLUSION
Consumer-directed Medicaid rests on false assumptions. Medicaid has
grown, but it remains a program for those who priced out of private health
insurance. Medicaid’s comprehensive benefit package and relatively low-cost
sharing are crucial design components for a safety net health insurance
program covering those with limited financial resources. No data supports the
claims of critics that Medicaid recipients overuse medical services. In fact,
studies conclude that Medicaid delivers better quality care to low-income
Americans than coverage modeled on private insurance.

174. Lisa Dubay & Genevieve M. Kenney, Health Care Access and Use Among Low-Income
Children: Who Fares Best?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 112, 116 (explaining their study
which looked at children in families with incomes between 100% to 200% of the FPL).
175. This outcome likely reflects the success of Medicaid in facilitating preventive services
for children as well as Medicaid’s historical lower cost sharing
176. BILL J. WRIGHT ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPACT OF CHANGES TO PREMIUMS,
COST-SHARING AND BENEFITS ON ADULT MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES: RESULTS FROM AN ONGOING STUDY OF THE OREGON HEALTH PLAN 11 (2005), available at http://www.cmwf.org/
usr_doc/Wright_impact_changes_premiums_Medicaid_Oregon.pdf.
177. See HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., HARDSHIPS IN AMERICA: THE
REAL STORY OF WORKING FAMILIES 2 (2001).
178. See id. While the very poor, those living below the FPL, have the most difficulty
making ends meet, the rate of hardships was almost identical for the near-poor, those with
incomes between 100% and 200% of the FPL, and the very poor. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

432

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:403

Ultimately, cost-shifting to Medicaid patients hurts not only consumers but
the health care system. Medicaid plays a critical role in funding the nation’s
safety net hospitals and clinics. When costs are shifted to patients, they may
go unpaid. For some hospitals this translates into a drop in funding, for others
it translates into more aggressive collection actions against patients.179 For
patients who can qualify for credit cards, it may begin a cycle of debt that ends
in bankruptcy.180 As the title of this symposium says, cost-shifting to
Medicaid patients is likely to go “from risk to ruin.”

179. See John D. Colombo, Federal and State Tax Exemption Policy, Medical Debt and
Healthcare for the Poor, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 443–44 (2007); Nancy M. Kane, Tax-Exempt
Hospitals: What Is Their Charitable Responsibility and How Should It Be Defined and
Reported?, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 459, 459–62 (2007).
180. See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 307, 319–20
(2007).

